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Table of Contents US Supreme Court:
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Board of Education of
Hendrick Hudson Central School
District v. Rowley, 458 US 176 (1982) [Special Education
- 3/8]
Facts: Amy was a first grade child who was hearing impaired. The child needed an FM transmitter. The parents also wanted a sign language interpreter. The student was progressing and performed better than the average student, but not as well as she could have with an interpreter.
Procedural History: The process began with an Administrative Hearing, then District Court, then Supreme Court. When the request for the interpreter was denied, the parents received a hearing before an independent examiner, who agreed with administration. The decision was affirmed by the New York Commission of Education on appeal. The Rowleys brought action in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court said that because Amy was not reaching her potential, she should receive additional services. They were concerned about the shortfall of achievement versus potential. A divided US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The District Court and the Court of Appeals erred when they held that the Act requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. Amy is receiving an adequate education. Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals and the District Court erred. Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
Issue: Are schools responsible for providing special education that serves the student’s full potential?
Holding: The state should provide a free and appropriate education, but not the best possible. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion, with two joining, one concurring, and three dissenting. The Education of the Handicapped Act provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped children. Prior to this time, children were excluded from schools or sat there idly awaiting the age to drop out.
Out of this case, students are entitled to an appropriate education, not the best possible. Everybody gets a Chevy. The Supreme Court decided that a disabled child's education must be comparable with that offered to nondisabled children, but not the best available. 1. Some educational benefit must occur. 2. Interpreted case-by-case. 3. More than 'trivial' progress. 4. If no progress in 3 years and the student continues to fail, it is not considered an appropriate education. 5. If skill regression and increasingly problem behavior persist, it is not considered an appropriate education. This is the first case in which the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret any provision of the SPED Act. At time of the Act, 1 million children with handicaps were excluded from an education and 4 million were receiving inappropriate education. The free and appropriate public education needs to be tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an “individualized educational program” (IEP).
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260 (1988) [Freedom
of Speech -- 3/8]
Hazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier et al., 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
Facts: St Louis. Student written articles about pregnancy and divorce prompted the administration stopped the journalism class paper because the pregnant students might be identified from the article. And the divorce article identified a student by name. Because of inadequate time for rewrites, the pages were withheld from the paper’s publication. Publishing would have been a possible invasion of student privacy. About the divorce article, the student had complained about the parents, who had no opportunity to respond. Three former students brought the suit.
Procedural History: The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court said there was no violation of freedom of speech.
Issue: Do administrators need a hands-off policy to ensure free speech of a high school student newspaper?
Holding: Students in public schools do not have the same rights as adults. This school paper is not a forum for public expression. If not a public forum, the school can place restrictions on any activities that are “an integral part of the school’s educational function.” The school’s policy was that “sponsored publications are developed within the adopted curriculum.” Their policy said that there would be freedom of speech so long as had responsible journalistic practices. This is not about silencing an individual student’s personal expression. “Educators are entitled to exercise greater control. . . to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.” The Principal acted responsibly. The student’s privacy in the pregnancy article was not adequately protected. The father criticized by the daughter should have been allowed to publicly defend himself, which violated journalistic fairness.
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Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US 651 (1977) [Discipline -- 3/8]
Facts: The Florida Legislature and Dade County School Board set standards for corporal punishment in their schools, which included explicit directions and limitations. For example, a student could be paddled on the buttocks 1-5 times with a wooden paddle of specific dimensions. Students James Ingraham, 8th grade, and Roosevelt Andrews, 9th grade, at Charles R. Drew Junior High School in Dade County, Florida claimed the paddling they received was excessive. Ingraham stated that on one occasion he received over 20 paddles that caused a hematoma and a prolonged absence from school. Andrews said he had been paddled several times without sufficient cause and twice on the arm, causing it to be lame for a week. As a result, Ingraham and Andrews filed a lawsuit claiming deprivation of their constitutional rights against Willie Wright, school principal, Lemmie Deliford, assistant principal, Soloman Barnes, assistant to the principal, and Edward Whigham, district superintendent.
Procedural History: The complaint was filed on 1/7/71 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After the testimony of sixteen students, the court found no constitutional basis for relief and that the punishment did not violate any constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, stating that the punishment did violate the 8th and 14th amendments. An en banc court then rejected the appellate court’s decision, reaffirming the District Court’s decision. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues: 1) Does paddling of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitute cruel and unusual punishment per the 8th Amendment? 2) If paddling is permissible, does due process, per the 14th Amendment, require prior notice and opportunity to be heard?
Holdings: 1) Common law and the historical foundations of the 8th Amendment confirm that the amendment is applicable only to those convicted of crimes. Therefore, it does not apply to paddling in schools. The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart form teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment (670). 2) Since school employees are under state law, the 14th Amendment applies in this case. Specifically, the state cannot hold and physically punish someone except in accordance with due process, which is considered a “liberty interest.” Since Florida law and common law allow corporal punishment then there is no deprivation of rights. In view of the low incidence of abuse, the openness of our schools, and the common-law safeguards that already exist, the risk of error that may result in violation of a schoolchild’s substantive rights can only be regarded as minimal. Imposing additional administrative safeguards as a constitutional requirement might reduce that risk marginally, but would also entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary educational responsibility. We conclude that the Due Process Clause does not require notice and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment in the public schools, as that practice is authorized and limited by the common law (682).
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Kinman
v. Omaha Public School District, 171 F. 3d 607 (8th Cir. 1999)
[Discrimination/Harassment 3/8]
Facts: During the 1987 – 1988 school year, a high school sophomore by the name of Janet Kinman had an English teacher by the name of Sheryl McDougall. Both parties remained friends during the summer of 1988 in which Janet Kinman had attempted suicide. Janet Kinman then explained to her mother that it was due to the fact her English teacher Sheryl McDougall tired convincing her that she was gay. Janet Kinman then began drinking her junior year in high school and as a result her English teacher Sheryl McDougall took Janet Kinman to a lesbian Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. As a culmination of these encounters, during the summer of 1989, the two mentioned above engaged in sexual relations.
On October 16, 1989, the principal John Mackiel had become aware of the relationship, John Mackiel removed the student from the teacher’s class and the relationship temporarily ended. After graduating in the spring of 1990, the student and teacher then resumed their sexual relationship in which the teacher Sheryl McDougall was terminated for having sexual relations with a student. This breaks the district’s policy of having sexual relations with former students within a two year time frame from graduation. In addition, Sheryl McDougall’s teacher’s license was revoked in 1992. As a result, the student brought to court: (1) sexual harassment and (2) district failing to provide a safe environment. This lawsuit entailed claims brought against the district, Mackiel, and Whitehouse and individually against McDougall.
Procedural History: Janet Kinman brought section 1983 action and Title IX hostile environment and sexual harassment case before the United States District Court for the district of Nebraska. The ruling was in favor of the defendants who were the district collectively and Sheryl McDougal individually. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Issue:
Does Janet Kinman have a cause of action against the Omaha Public School District and Sheryl McDougall in regards to Title IX and Section 1983?
Holding: It was ruled that the student Janet Kinman did not produce a sufficient amount of evidence that would make the courts believe that the district reacted deliberately indifferent after being notified of the relationship between the student and teacher as implemented by Title IX. Secondly, the teacher could not be sued individually for reasons of breaking Title IX due to her not being a federally funded institution. Finally, student could bring an individual suit against the teacher for violating section 1983 in regards to Fourteenth Amendment for bodily harm and sexual abuse. Kinman v. Omaha Public School District I. Background a. During 1987-1988 school year, a high school student by the name of Janet Kinman had a sophomore English teacher by the name of Sheryl McDougall. b. Summer of 1988 Janet Kinman tried to commit suicide. i. Janet explained to mother Sheryl McDougall tried convincing her to lead a gay lifestyle. c. During junior year in high school student began to drink and the English teacher took her to a lesbian Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. d. During the summer of 1989, sexual relations began between Janet Kinman and Sheryl McDougal. e. Fall of 1989, the principal John Mackiel became aware of the relationship and removed the student from the teacher’s class. i. This temporarily subsided the sexual relationship f. After graduation in the spring of 1990, the relationship resumed between the student and teacher. i. As a result of a district policy prohibiting sexual relations between student and teacher for a window of two years from graduation, the teacher was terminated from the district. ii. Teacher also lost her teaching certificate. II. Issue a. Does Janet Kinman have a cause of action against the Omaha Public School District and Sheryl McDougall in regards to Title IA and Section 1983? III. Procedural History a. Janet Kinman brought Section 1983 (14th Amendment for bodily harm and sexual abuse) and Title IX (sexual harassment) case before the United States District Court for the district of Nebraska. The ruling was in favor of the defendants who were the district collectively and Sheryl McDougal individually. Case taken to the Court of Appeals. IV. Ruling a. District – Court of Appeals supported the district courts for the reasoning that the courts felt that the district and its officials acted sufficiently towards correcting the present situation. b. Individually i. Student could not sue the teacher for breaking the Title IX due to the fact that it is not a federally funded institution. ii. Student could sue the teacher for violating Section 1983 in regards to the 14th Amendment for bodily harm and sexual abuse.
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Howard
v. Columbia Public School District, 363 F. 3d. 797 (8th Cir. 2004)
[Teacher Rights --3/14]
Facts: Dr. Karol Howard was hired in 1998 as principal of Robert E. Lee Elementary in Columbia, Missouri, where she served for two years. At the end of her second year, various parties (teachers, PTA members, and parents) sent complaints to the district criticizing Howard’s leadership. A new job was created for her in the district but after three days she returned to her principalship at Lee Elementary. Since a new principal was already in place Howard was put on administrative leave. She was then appointed as principal to a new school for the 2000-2001 school district. On April 10, 2001 Howard was notified that her contract would not be renewed for the next school year. Howard filed a complaint in 2001 against the district, including Ritter, the superintendent, and Cozette, the deputy superintendent. Howard alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 including 1) freedom of speech, 2) procedural due process, 3) substantive due process and equal protection. She sought reinstatement, lost wages, benefits, a clear record, and payment for attorney fees.
Procedural History: After a year of discovery the district (Defendant) filed a motion for summary judgment, which prompted Howard to file objections and a motion for partial summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to the district. Howard then appealed the district court decision, which was accepted by the 8th Circuit Court.
Issues: 1) Did Cozette and Ritter violate Howard’s free speech when they removed her as principal because Howard spoke out in favor of literacy training and against the ill treatment of certain groups of children? 2) Did the Defendants deny Howard’s liberty and property interests without due process? 3) Did Howard suffer two substantive due process violations? 4) Was Howard treated less favorably than other principals and therefore denied 14th Amendment privileges of equal protection? 5) Did Ritter and Cozette interfere with and breach Howard’s contract?
Holdings: 1) Howard did not present sufficient evidence that her speech motivated the Defendants to discontinue employment. In addition, Howard presented no evidence against the Defendants’ claim that they removed her because of tension among the faculty and low morale. 2) LIBERTY: No evidence was provided by Howard to show that public allegations were made by the Defendants that would make it difficult or impossible for her to escape the stigma of the charges. PROPERTY: According to MO law, Howard had no tenure rights as principal and thus received all the process she was due. Also, since the district provided her another job and had notified her prior to April 15 of her non-renewal, it had fulfilled its contractual obligations. 3) First, Howard argued that she was deprived her right to engage as an educator, which was not considered on appeal. Second, Howard claimed that the stigma surrounding her release would prevent her from clearing her name and obtaining future employment. The claim was considered without merit because Howard had not been subjected to any stigmatizing conduct or comments. 4) Howard did not present any evidence establishing that the Defendants’ decision was based upon a discriminatory reason. 5) Howard had to prove that malice was the reason for her dismissal, which she did not. In sum, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
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